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This paper presents a model of political competition with campaign contributions and informative
political advertising. Policy-motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide
contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like-minded candidates. Contributions are used to
finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates’ ideologies. The
model embodies rational behavior on the part of all actors, is analytically tractable, and has a unique
equilibrium. The paper uses the model to analyze the welfare economics of contribution limits. Such
limits are shown to redistribute welfare from moderate voters to interest group members. They may or







This paper presents a model of political competition with campaign contributions and informative
political advertising. The model incorporates three groups of political actors; parties who select
candidates, interest groups who contribute to candidates, and voters who vote for candidates.
Campaign contributions are position induced in the sense that interest groups give to enhance the
electoral prospects of like-minded candidates (as opposed to buying policy favors). Interest groups’
contributions are used to ﬁnance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information
about candidates’ ideologies. The model embodies rational behavior on the part of all actors, is
analytically tractable, and has a unique equilibrium.
In light of the explosion of theoretical models of electoral competition, the reader might be
forgiven for questioning the value of yet another one.1 The development of this model is motivated
by a desire to analyze issues in the ﬁnancing of political campaigns. The appropriate regulation of
campaign contributions is an important topic in the United States, with signiﬁcant dissatisfaction
with the current system and many proposals for reform. To analyze such proposals, one needs
a framework that adequately captures the role contributions play in elections. As commonly
understood, this role is to ﬁnance the provision of information about candidates to voters. From
a social viewpoint, this means that contributions should help produce more informed choices.
Moreover, their presence should provide parties with a greater incentive to select candidates with
characteristics that voters want. While there have been a number of interesting studies of campaign
contributions, the literature has yet to produce a theory that satisfactorily captures this role. The
model presented here is designed to ﬁll this gap.
The model assumes that there are two political parties representing opposing ideologies. Parties
can choose to run either partisan or moderate candidates, with party members preferring the
1 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for overviews of recent work.
1ideology of the former. Voters know a candidate’s party aﬃliation but not whether he is a partisan
or a moderate. Advertising allows a candidate to provide voters with this information. The idea
is that candidates have past records that reveal their ideologies and advertising can inform voters
of those records.2 Such advertising can be advantageous for a moderate candidate because it
may attract moderate voters of the opposing ideology. Resources for campaign advertising are
provided by interest groups consisting of partisans of opposing ideologies. These groups contribute
only to moderate candidates because only they can beneﬁt from advertising their ideologies.3
To illustrate the value of the model for policy analysis, the paper uses it to study the case
for limiting the amount that interest groups can contribute to campaigns. The analysis reveals
a basic trade-oﬀ: contribution limits reduce expected campaign spending, but also decrease the
likelihood that parties select moderate candidates. The existence of this trade-oﬀ means that
contribution limits cannot be evaluated via the Pareto criterion. Rather, they redistribute welfare
between diﬀerent groups. Moderate voters are made worse oﬀ;p a r t i s a n sw h od on o tb e l o n gt o
interest groups are unaﬀected; and partisans who are interest group members are actually made
better oﬀ.T h u s , imposing a contribution limit redistributes welfare from moderates to interest
group members. The question of whether the gains to interest group members oﬀset the losses
to moderate voters turns on the fraction of the latter in the population. Contribution limits are
always desirable from an aggregate viewpoint when only a small fraction of the population are
moderates, while limits will tend to be harmful when moderates dominate.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section explains how
2 Thus, for example, moderate left-wing candidates will have records of being tough on crime, ﬁscally responsible,
or pro vouchers. Alternatively, if they have not previously held elected oﬃce, they will have had business experience
and displayed strong family values. In contrast, their partisan counterparts will have records of support for radical
programs (such as gay marriage), a history of community activism, or strong ties to the union movement. They
may also have belonged to partisan associations (such as Al Sharpton’s presidential advisory committee).
3 The conclusion that partisan candidates recieve no campaign contributions arises because there is only one
dimension of diﬀerence between candidates and negative advertising is not permitted. In reality, it would be an
unusual race in which a candidate could not beneﬁt by revealing some information about himself or his opponent.
Nonetheless, the general conclusion that those candidates with characteristics that swing voters value should, ceteris
paribus, receive larger contributions would seem a natural implication of the informational perspective.
2the paper relates to previous work on electoral competition and campaign contributions, and to
the literature on informative advertising in market contexts. Section 3 presents the model and
Section 4 studies equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes the impact of contribution limits. Section 6
concludes with a summary of the lessons of the analysis and some suggestions for future research.
2 Related literature
The model presented here builds on the work of Besley and Coate (2000) and (2001). These
papers employ a model of political competition in which policy-motivated parties compete by
selecting candidates who are characterized by their policy preferences and interest groups provide
position induced contributions to these candidates.4 In the model, however, contributions are
used to ﬁnance advertising that attracts the votes of “noise voters”.5 The reason why noise voters
respond to advertising is not explained. Moreover, a candidate’s ability to attract their votes is
independent of his or his opponent’s policy stance, precluding an informational interpretation.
This paper extends this model of electoral competition to incorporate an informational, micro-
founded role for campaign contributions.
There are relatively few papers that study informative campaign advertising. Austen-Smith
(1987) presents a framework that shares some features with that presented here. In his model,
two oﬃce-seeking candidates compete by selecting positions in a one dimensional policy space.
Two interest groups with ideal points to the left and right of the median voter oﬀer position
induced contributions. Voters have common but noisy perceptions of candidates’ policy positions
and campaign advertising reduces the variance of these perceptions. Since voters are risk averse,
this helps even a candidate with an extreme position. The focus of the analysis is to understand
how the presence of the interest groups inﬂuences the positions taken by the candidates.
4 These papers in turn build on the citizen-candidate models of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and
Slivinski (1996).
5 This follows the approach of Baron (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1996).
3While interesting and creative, Austen-Smith’s analysis has two drawbacks. First, it is not
explained why voters are uncertain about candidates’ policy positions and how this uncertainty
is reduced by advertising. Indeed, in equilibrium, there is no uncertainty in candidates’ choices
and hence, from a game theoretic perspective, no reason that voters should be uncertain. Second,
without artiﬁcially restricting the candidates to choose diﬀerent positions, equilibrium involves
candidates choosing the same positions and no contributions being given. Thus, the model does
not naturally yield an explanation for campaign contributions.
Ortuno-Ortin and Schultz (2000) discuss informative advertising in their interesting analysis of
the public funding of campaigns. They model two policy-motivated political parties who compete
by choosing positions in a one-dimensional policy space. There is a ﬁxed pot of public money
made available for ﬁnancing campaigns. The two parties must use any money allocated to them
to inform voters of their positions.6 The paper studies parties’ choice of platforms under two
assumptions concerning the allocation of public funding: (i) each party receives an exogenous
share of the funds and (ii) each party’s share of the funds is an increasing function of its vote
share. In equilibrium, there is no uncertainty concerning each party’s platform choice and hence
all voters, having been exposed to advertising or not, know each party’s position. This feature
means that the campaign advertising is ineﬀective in equilibrium. Accordingly, if it were ﬁnanced
by private citizens, none would be provided.
Schultz (2001) discusses the targeting of informative advertising in a model in which two parties
compete for votes by promising transfers to diﬀerent groups (as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)).
Parties care both about votes and the ideological purity of their proposed redistributions. Voters
do not directly observe parties’ proposals but can be informed of their transfers via campaign
advertising. Each party has an exogenous advertising budget and advertising can be perfectly
6 If voters believe that their position is closer to the median than it actually is, then parties would have no
incentive to advertise and hence this constraint may bind.
4targeted to the diﬀerent groups. Voters are uncertain about parties’ ideological preferences so
that, in equilibrium, there is genuine uncertainty concerning parties’ proposals. As in this paper,
uninformed voters make rational inferences based on knowledge of parties’ strategies. Schultz
studies the joint determination of transfers and advertising, establishing a number of interesting
conclusions concerning the groups who will attract the most intensive campaigning. Schultz’s
analysis is complementary to that pursued here in that it seeks to shed light on how parties
will use such campaign resources as they have. By contrast, the analysis of this paper seeks to
understand the level of resources allocated to campaigning.
Following the industrial organization literature on advertising as a signal (Milgrom and Roberts
(1986)), a number of authors have argued that campaign advertising is best understood as provid-
ing information indirectly (Potters, Sloof, and Van Winden (1997), Prat (1999), (2000)). These
papers assume that candidates have some valence characteristic such as competence and interest
groups can observe this more precisely than voters. The amount of campaign money that a candi-
date collects signals his valence to voters. Hence, although campaign advertising does not convey
information directly, it does so indirectly. In Prat’s (1999) insightful analysis, two oﬃce-seeking
candidates, who may diﬀer in competence, compete by staking out positions in a one dimensional
policy space. A single interest group with non-median policy preferences oﬀers contributions to
candidates in exchange for them moving their platforms towards its preferred policy position.
Thus contributions are service induced. Candidates the interest group believes to be more com-
petent are oﬀered larger contributions because they are more likely to win. This is because voters
observe a noisy signal of competence and hence, ceteris paribus, are more likely to vote for the
more competent candidate. In equilibrium, therefore, the more a candidate advertises, the higher
is his competence. Campaign contributions are good for voters in the sense that they provide
information about competence, but bad in that they lead candidates to distort policy. Banning
contributions can raise voters’ aggregate welfare when the losses in terms of information about
5competence are smaller than the costs of policy distortion.7
There is much of interest in this argument. However, the widespread employment of high priced
political strategists suggests that the content of campaign advertisements matters.8 Moreover,
campaign advertisements typically do provide veriﬁable information about candidates’ records.
Such information includes their accomplishments in the private sector or military service, their
family history, the public programs they have proposed or supported, things they have done for
their constituents, endorsements from community leaders, etc. While it is true that there is
nothing in the United States legal system to prevent candidates from lying about these things,9
the threat of being exposed by the media (or perhaps just basic human decency) makes bold-faced
lying the exception rather than the rule. Thus, to focus solely on the signalling role of campaign
advertising misses an important part of its function.
It is interesting to contrast the role of informative advertising in political competition with that
in market competition (see, for example, Nelson (1976)). In political competition, one may think
of the candidates that parties select as diﬀerentiated products and an individual voter’s decision
to vote for a particular candidate as like a purchase decision. To the extent that interest groups
seek to maximize the votes for their party’s candidate, the situation seems broadly analogous to
informative advertising by producers in an industry with diﬀerentiated products. The seminal
analysis of such advertising is due to Grossman and Shapiro (1984). In their model, ﬁrms are
characterized by their product type and use advertising to inform consumers of their product and
7 See Prat (1999) for the precise conditions under which this occurs. While Prat does not consider the distribu-
tional consequences of contribution limits, it seems likely that in his model banning contributions is either Pareto
ineﬃcient or redistributes from citizens on the side of the interest group to those on the other side of the political
spectrum. Welfare conclusions more in keeping with the ﬁndings of this paper might be expected with two interest
groups with preferred policies either side of the median voter. In such circumstances, interest group competition
may reduce the costs of policy distortion and thereby dissipate interest groups’ policy gains. For an analysis of
multiple interest groups in a related framework see Prat (2000).
8 Presumably, it is unreasonable to suppose that voters observe the wage paid to political consultants and hence
the hiring of such consultants cannot itself be put down to signalling.
9 In the United States, the First Amendment protects advertising as free speech. Thus, in contrast to commercial
advertising, citizens have no legal recourse against a candidate who lies about his (or his opponent’s) record.
6its price. Consumers choose from the set of products whose advertisements they see. Accordingly,
if a ﬁrm does not advertise it receives no sales because consumers are unaware of its existence.
Thus, advertising plays the social role of creating surplus enhancing matches. With respect to the
optimality of the equilibrium level of advertising, Grossman and Shapiro identify two conﬂicting
divergences between private and social incentives. On the one hand, ﬁrms under-advertise because
they do not capture all the surplus from the matches they create. On the other, they over-advertise
because they do not take into account the fact that some of their increased sales come at the
e x p e n s eo fc o m p e t i t o r s .
Contrasting the analysis here with Grossman and Shapiro (1984) suggests at least three dif-
ferences between informative advertising in political and market competition. First, and most
fundamentally, voters see a list of all candidates at the time they vote and hence must be aware
of the existence of a candidate even if they have not seen this candidate’s advertisement.T h u s ,
if they do not know a candidate’s characteristics, they must form expectations of them at the
time of voting. These expectations determine the eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising. For if
voters expect unadvertised candidates to have the attributes of advertised candidates, campaign
advertising will be ineﬀective. The necessity of solving for citizens’ beliefs concerning unadvertised
candidates is the major analytical challenge in studying advertising in the political context. A
second diﬀerence is that parties choose their candidates - they do not inherit ﬁxed locations.10
Finally, since parties choose candidates and interest groups ﬁnance them, the actors choosing prod-
uct characteristics and those ﬁnancing their advertising are diﬀerent. Moreover, interest groups
are concerned with the policy outcome and hence are concerned with votes only indirectly. These
diﬀerences not withstanding, analogies to the divergences between private and social incentives
leading to over and under advertising in the market context emerge from this analysis.
10 This is a diﬀerence between the analysis in this paper and that in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). Obviously,
in reality, ﬁrms choose the type of their products as well.
73 The model
3.1 Basics
A community must elect a representative. Citizens diﬀer in their ideology which is measured on
a 0 to 1 scale. The population is divided into three groups: leftists, rightists, and moderates.
Leftists and rightists have ideologies d and 1 − d respectively, where d<1
2. Moderates come in
two types: left-leaning and right-leaning with ideologies x and 1 −x where x ∈ (d, 1
2). Moderates
make up a fraction γ of the community and the remaining 1−γ are evenly divided between leftists
and rightists. The fraction of moderates who are left-leaning, denoted µ, is ex ante uncertain,
reﬂecting the ﬂuid nature of moderate attitudes. Speciﬁcally, µ is the realization of a random
variable uniformly distributed on [0,1].
Candidates for community representative are put forward by two political parties: Party L,
comprised of leftists and Party R, comprised of rightists. Candidates are citizens and hence are
characterized by their ideologies. Each party can select either a “partisan” or a “moderate”
candidate. Speciﬁcally, Party L selects a candidate with ideology d or x and Party R chooses
one with ideology 1 − x or 1 − d. Decisions as to which type of candidate to select are made
to maximize the payoﬀ of the representative party member. At the time at which candidates
are selected, party members do not know the fraction of moderates who are left-leaning making
election outcomes uncertain.
The payoﬀ enjoyed by a citizen with ideology i from having a leader of ideology i0 is given by
−β |i − i0| where |i − i0| is the distance from i to i0 and β > 0. It is assumed that x − d>1 − 2x
which implies that moderates prefer a moderate candidate of the opposing ideology to a partisan
candidate of their own ideology. Thus, left-leaning moderates (for example) will prefer the ideology
of Party R’s candidate to that of Party L’s candidate if the former is a moderate and the latter
is a partisan.
8Moderates do not have perfect information about candidates, in the sense of not knowing
whether each party’s candidate is a partisan or a moderate. Such information could be acquired,
but moderates are not politically engaged and choose to remain “rationally ignorant”. However,
candidates can convey information concerning their characteristics via advertising. Moderates
cannot ignore such advertising since it is bundled with radio or television programming.
Campaign advertising is governed by the following rules. First, candidates can only advertise
their own characteristics; i.e., whether they are moderate or partisan. This rules out negative
advertising.11 Second, candidates can only advertise the truth. The idea is that candidates
have records which reveal their ideologies and that candidates cannot lie about their records. The
advertising technology is such that if a candidate spends an amount C, his message reaches a
fraction λ(C)= C
α+C of the population, where α > 0.
Candidates’ advertising is ﬁnanced by campaign contributions provided by interest groups.
There are two interest groups - a leftist group that contributes to Party L’s candidate and a
rightist group that contributes to Party R’s. A fraction θ of partisans belong to each interest
group. The interest groups choose contribution levels to maximize the expected payoﬀ of their
members. They observe the type of their party’s candidate before making contributions, and
hence only give to moderate candidates. It is assumed, however, that they do not observe the
type of the opposing party’s candidate at the time of contributing.12
Parties choose candidates anticipating the contributions they will receive and the impact of
these on voters’ choices. Each interest group observes its party’s choice and decides on its con-
11 It would be possible to introduce negative advertising by allowing a candidate to inform voters that his
opponent is a partisan. Since this signiﬁcantly complicates the model, I leave it for future work.
12 This assumption is made to simplify the analysis. If interest groups know the type of the opposing party’s
candidate, they will contribute more to a candidate running against a partisan than a moderate. This is because the
beneﬁt to them of electing their own party’s candidate is higher in the former case. This diﬀerence in contribution
levels means that seeing an advertisement for a candidate provides information to voters about the likely type of
his opponent. After all, a voter is more likely to see an advertisement for a candidate when he is running against a
partisan. While this eﬀect is interesting and it is perfectly possible to carry out the analysis taking it into account,
it is an additional wrinkle that complicates an already intricate analysis. Accordingly, the eﬀect is assumed away
here.
9tribution. Partisans always vote for the candidate put forward by the party representing their
ideology. Moderates, having possibly observed one or both candidates’ advertisements, update
their beliefs about candidates’ types and vote. They may vote for either party’s candidate. To
smooth out behavior among the two types of moderates, they are assumed to vote probabilistically.
These behaviors are now described in greater detail.
3.2 Behavior of moderate voters
At the time of voting, each moderate voter may have seen advertisements from both, one, or
neither candidate. Let (IL,I R) denote a moderate voter’s information where IK = 1 if he has
seen an advertisement from Party K’s candidate and IK =0i fn o t . L e tρK(IL,I R)d e n o t eh i s
belief that Party K’s candidate is moderate conditional on informational state (IL,I R). Since only
moderate candidates advertise, both ρL(1,I R)a n dρR(IL,1) must equal 1. The beliefs ρL(0,I R)
and ρR(IL,0) will be derived as part of the equilibrium. Letting vK(J;IL,I R)d e n o t eam o d e r a t e
voter of type K’s expected payoﬀ from Party J’s candidate being elected when the voter has
information (IL,I R), we have that
vK(K;IL,I R)=−(1 − ρK(IL,I R))β(x − d),
and for J 6= K
vK(J;IL,I R)=−ρJ(IL,I R)β(1 − 2x) − (1 − ρJ(IL,I R))β(1 − d − x).
Following the literature on probabilistic voting, a moderate voter of type K in informational
state (IL,I R) votes for Party L’s candidate if and only if vK(L;IL,I R)+ε ≥ vK(R;IL,I R)w h e r e
ε is the realization of a random variable with range [−ε,ε]( ε > 0) and symmetric cumulative
distribution function H(ε) . T h ef r a c t i o no fm o d e r a t ev o t e r so ft y p eK in informational state
(IL,I R) voting for Party L’s candidate is therefore
ξK(IL,I R)=1− H(vK(R;IL,I R) − vK(L;IL,I R)),
10w h e r ew ea d o p tt h ec o n v e n t i o nt h a tH(ε) = 0 for all ε ≤− ε and H(ε) = 1 for all ε ≥ ε.
It is assumed that ε is smaller than the minimum of β(1 − 2x)a n dβ(3x − d − 1). This
implies that type K moderates who believe that Party K’s candidate is at least as likely to be
moderate as the opposing Party’s candidate will always vote for him. In particular, this means that
ξL(1,I R)=1a n dξR(IL,1) = 0. In addition, the assumption implies that all type K moderates
who know that their party’s candidate is partisan and that the opposing candidate is moderate
will vote for the latter.
3.3 Election probabilities
Given this voting behavior, the probability that each party’s candidate will win may be computed.
Let CL and CR denote the contribution levels the two interest groups provide to moderate can-
didates. Then, if both candidates are moderates, the fraction of left-leaning moderates voting for
Party L’s candidate is
δL(CL,C R)=λ(CL)+ξL(0,1)(1 − λ(CL))λ(CR)+ξL(0,0)(1 − λ(CL))(1 − λ(CR)).
This includes all those who have seen the advertisement of Party L’s candidate; a fraction ξL(0,1)
of those who have seen only the advertisement of Party R’s candidate; and a fraction ξL(0,0) of
those who have seen neither candidate’s advertisement. The fraction of right-leaning moderates
voting for Party L’s candidate is
δR(CL,C R)=ξR(1,0)(1 − λ(CR))λ(CL)+ξR(0,0)(1 − λ(CR))(1 − λ(CL)).
It includes a fraction ξR(1,0) of those who have seen only the advertisement of Party L’s candidate;
and a fraction ξR(0,0) of those who have seen neither candidate’s advertisement.
The fraction of moderates voting for Party L’s candidate is µδL +( 1− µ)δR. Given the as-
sumption that partisans are equally split between rightists and leftists, Party L’s candidate will
win if this fraction exceeds 1/2o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,i fµ ≥ (1/2 − δR)/(δL − δR). This implies that
11the probability that Party L’s candidate wins is π(CL,C R), where the probability of winning
function π is deﬁned as follows: π(CL,C R)=0i f( 1 /2 − δR)/(δL − δR) ≥ 1, π(CL,C R)=1i f
(1/2 − δR)/(δL − δR) ≤ 0, and
π(CL,C R)=1−
1/2 − δR(CL,C R)
δL(CL,C R) − δR(CL,C R)
=
δL(CL,C R) − 1/2
δL(CL,C R) − δR(CL,C R)
.
otherwise.
If only Party L’s candidate is a moderate, he wins with probability π(CL,0). Similarly, if only
Party R’s candidate is a moderate, the probability that Party L’s candidate wins is π(0,C R). If
both candidates are partisans, then no contributions are given and Party L’s candidate wins with
probability π(0,0).
3.4 Interest group contributions
The contribution levels provided to moderate candidates by the two interest groups must be mutual
best responses given voter behavior. The interest groups do not observe the type of the opposing
party’s candidate when making their contributions and seek to maximize the expected payoﬀ of
their representative member. Thus, the leftist interest group’s contribution CL maximizes
χRπ(C,CR)β(1 − 2x)+( 1− χR)π(C,0)β(1 − x − d) − 2C/(1 − γ)θ,
where χR is the probability it assigns to Party R selecting a moderate. Similarly, the rightist
interest group’s contribution CR maximizes
χL(1 − π(CL,C))β(1 − 2x)+( 1− χL)(1 − π(0,C))β(1 − x − d) − 2C/(1 − γ)θ,
where χL is the probability it assigns to Party L selecting a moderate.
3.5 Candidate selection
Parties choose the type of candidate to run anticipating interest group contributions and voter
b e h a v i o r .T h e ys e e kt om a x i m i z et h ep a y o ﬀ of their representative member, who is assumed not
12to belong to the interest group.13 Let τK ∈ {M,P} denote the type of Party K’s candidate
and let UK(τL,τR) denote the expected payoﬀ of a partisan of type K if the types of candidates
selected are (τL,τR).14 We let σK denote the probability that Party K selects a moderate and
assume that (σL,σR) are mutual best responses for the two parties.
3.6 Political equilibrium
A political equilibrium consists of (i) candidate selection strategies for the two parties (σL,σR)
describing the probability that each party selects a moderate; (ii) contribution levels for the
two interest groups (CL,C R) describing the contributions they make to moderate candidates; (iii)
interest group beliefs (χR,χL) describing the probabilities they assign to the opposing party having
chosen a moderate; (iv) voting behavior functions (ξL(IL,I R),ξR(IL,I R)) describing moderates’
voting behavior as a function of the information they have received in the campaign; and (v)
voter belief functions (ρL(IL,I R),ρR(IL,I R)) describing moderates’ beliefs concerning candidate
types as a function of the information they have. Candidate selection strategies must be mutual
best responses given subsequent interest group and voter behavior. Interest groups’ contribution
strategies must be mutual best responses given subsequent voter behavior and their beliefs. Voter
behavior must be consistent with their beliefs. Interest groups beliefs must be consistent with
parties strategies and voters’ beliefs must be consistent with the strategies of parties and interest
groups.
The analysis will focus on political equilibria that are symmetric in the sense that the two
parties choose moderates with the same probability (i.e., σL = σR = σ); interest groups contribute
the same amount to their parties’ moderate candidates (i.e., CL = CR = C); moderates vote in
13 If the representative party member also belonged to the interest group, parties would need to take into account
the cost of the contributions their candidates would receive.
14 Thus,
UL(M,M)=π(CL,C R)β(1 − 2x) − β(1 − x − d),
and
UR(M,M)=( 1− π(CL,C R))β(1 − 2x) − β(1 − x − d),
and so on.
13the same way (i.e., ξL(0,0) = 1− ξR(0,0) and ξL(0,1) = 1− ξR(1,0)); and moderates’ beliefs
about the two candidates are symmetric (i.e., ρL(0,0) = ρR(0,0) and ρL(0,1) = ρR(1,0)). In such
an equilibrium, moderates who have observed neither candidate’s advertisement are loyal to their
party’s candidate; i.e., ξL(0,0) = 1− ξR(0,0) = 1. Thus, letting ξ = ξR(1,0) and ρ = ρL(0,1), a
symmetric political equilibrium may be described by the vector (σ,C,ξ,ρ). There is no need to
include interest group beliefs in the description of equilibrium, since these are simply σ.
The variable ξ represents the fraction of right-leaning (left-leaning) moderates who vote for
Party L’s candidate (Party R’s candidate) when they have only observed an advertisement from
this candidate. It measures the eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising in inducing moderate voters
to switch from their natural allegiances. When ξ is high, voters are easily swayed and when ξ is
low, campaign advertising is ineﬀective. Together with the two interest groups’ contributions, ξ
determines the fractions of left and right-wing moderates voting for their party’s candidate. We
recognize this dependence by writing the probability of winning function as π(CL,C R;ξ).
Voters’ loyalty is determined by ρ - their beliefs concerning the probability that their party’s
c a n d i d a t ei sm o d e r a t ew h e nt h e yh a v eo n l ys e e na nadvertisement from the opposing candidate.
Assuming that σ > 0a n dC>0, ρ is tied down by Bayes Rule. However, if σ = 0, then the event
of observing one candidate’s advertisement does not arise along the equilibrium path and ρ is not
tied down. Thus, there exist symmetric equilibria in which σ =0a n dρ is large enough to make
ξ so small as to make campaign advertising ineﬀective. Since it seems unreasonable to suppose
that ρ is anything other than 0 when both parties are selecting partisans with probability one,
I focus only on symmetric equilibria which have the property that σ = 0 implies that ρ =0 . 15
Henceforth, a symmetric equilibrium is understood to be an equilibrium satisfying this additional
requirement.
15 For a more technical defense of this focus, note that equilibria in which σ =0a n dρ > 0d on o ts a t i s f yt h e
requirement that there exist a sequence (σn,C n)∞
n=1 such that (σn,C n) ∈ (0,1) × (0,∞)a n dlimn→∞(σn,C n)=
(σ,C) with the property that limn→∞ρn = ρ where ρn a r et h eb e l i e f si m p l i e db yB a y e sR u l eg i v e n( σn,C n). Thus,
such equilibria are not sequential equilibria (Kreps and Wilson (1982)).
143.7 Welfare
For welfare analysis, the expected payoﬀs of the various types of citizens in a symmetric political
equilibrium need to be calculated. With probability σ2 both parties select a moderate and with
probability 2σ(1 − σ) only one party selects a moderate. In the former case, both candidates
spend C on their campaigns and, in the latter, the moderate candidate spends C. Thus, expected
campaign spending is E =[ 2 σ(1 − σ)C + σ22C]=2 Cσ. Moreover, when there is only one
moderate, he wins with probability π(C,0;ξ) and hence the probability that a moderate is elected
is σ2 +2 σ(1 − σ)π(C,0;ξ).
Consider a leftist who is not an interest group member. Given symmetry, the elected candidate
is equally likely to be from either party. The expected payoﬀ of the leftist if the elected candidate
is a partisan is therefore −β(1−2d)/2. If, on the other hand, the elected candidate is a moderate
the payoﬀ of the leftist is −β[(x−d)/2+(1−x−d)/2] which again equals −β(1−2d)/2. Thus, the
leftist does not beneﬁt from the elected candidate being more likely to be a moderate: the gain
from a lower chance of getting a rightist is just oﬀset by the loss from an reduced chance of getting
al e f t i s t . 16 Similar remarks apply to rightists who are not interest group members. Interest group
members ﬁnance campaign spending and hence obtain expected payoﬀs −β(1−2d)/2−E/(1−γ)θ.
Now consider a representative moderate. From an ex-ante perspective, he will be left-leaning
with probability µ and right-leaning with probability 1−µ where µ is the realization of a uniformly
distributed random variable. Computing his payoﬀ is complicated by the correlation between
which party’s candidate wins and the likelihood that he is left or right-leaning. To illustrate,
suppose that both parties have selected moderates. If µ<1/2 then the majority of moderates
are right-leaning and Party R’s candidate will win. Accordingly, the representative moderate’s
expected payoﬀ is −µβ(1 − 2x). If µ>1/2t h e nP a r t yL’s candidate wins and the representative
16 This result does depend on the assumption that citizens have distance preferences. If instead, we assumed
that citizens had preferences of the form v(|i − i0|)w h e r ev is decreasing and strictly concave, then the leftist would
beneﬁt from the elected candidate being more likely to be moderate.
15moderate’s expected payoﬀ is −(1−µ)β(1−2x). Taking expectations over µ, the expected welfare
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are states in which Party L’s candidate will win. Indeed, ensuring that this is the case is the key
function of elections in this model.
Pursuing this logic for the cases in which both parties select partisans and only one party
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The second and third terms are, respectively, the expected payoﬀs when parties select partisans
and only one party selects a moderate. A detailed derivation of them can be found in the Appendix.
Aggregate expected welfare for the community is given by:
W(σ,π(C,0;ξ),E)=γWM(σ,π(C,0;ξ)) − (1 − γ)β(1 − 2d)/2 − E.
Aggregate welfare depends on three key variables: the probability that parties select moderates,
the probability that a moderate defeats a partisan, and expected campaign spending.
4 Characterization of political equilibrium
In this section, the unique symmetric equilibrium is characterized. We ﬁrst understand how much
the interest groups will contribute to candidates, taking as given the eﬀectiveness of campaign
advertising. Then, taking into account this contribution behavior, we examine how parties choose
candidates. Finally, we solve for voters’ behavior.




This assumption ensures that equilibrium involves positive levels of campaign contributions. With-
out it, interest groups do not ﬁnd it worthwhile to contribute to moderate candidates. Accordingly,
parties experience no electoral advantage from selecting moderates and equilibrium involves both
parties choosing partisans.
4.1 Campaign contributions
Given σ and ξ,ac o n t r i b u t i o nl e v e lC is a mutual best response for the two interest groups if and
only if
C =a r gm a x
CL≥0
{σπ(CL,C;ξ)β(1 − 2x)+( 1− σ)π(CL,0;ξ)β(1 − x − d) − 2CL/(1 − γ)θ}.




∂CL is a decreasing function of C.17 These facts allow us to establish
t h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t ,t h ep r o o fo fw h i c hm a yb ef o u n di nt h eA p p e n d i x .
Lemma 1 For all (σ,ξ) ∈ [0,1]2 there exists a unique contribution level that is a mutual best
response for the two interest groups.
We denote this unique level by b C(σ,ξ). Obviously, if (σ,C,ξ,ρ) is an equilibrium then it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a tC = b C(σ,ξ). On the range of the parameter space in which contributions
are such that a moderate candidate defeats a partisan with a probability between 1
2 and 1 (i.e.,
π(b C,0;ξ) ∈ (1
2,1)), interest groups give more if there is a higher probability that their party’s
candidate will face a partisan, so b C(σ,ξ) is decreasing in σ. Moreover, interest groups give more
when campaign advertising is more eﬀective so that b C is increasing in ξ.18 In addition, when an
17 The assumptions that make the probability of winning function well-behaved are those concerning the distri-
bution of µ and the advertising technology.
18 This property does not necessarily hold when π(b C,0;ξ)=1 , since reducing ξ w i l ln e c e s s i t a t ea ni n c r e a s ei n
contributions to maintain certain victory.
17interest group believes the other side will select a partisan for sure (σ = 0) and when campaign
advertising is maximally eﬀective (ξ = 1), then it gives an amount suﬃcient to ensure the victory
of its party’s candidate with probability one. This and the previous claims are established in the
Appendix.
4.2 Parties’ choice of candidates
When choosing the type of candidate to select, parties take as given voters’ behavior and the
contributions moderate candidates will attract from the interest groups. This behavior determines
the probability that each type of candidate will win. In a symmetric equilibrium, if both parties
choose the same type of candidate, each party’s candidate wins with equal probability. Thus, for
each Party K, UK(τ,τ)=−β(1−2d)/2f o rτ ∈ {M,P}. If one party chooses a moderate and the
other a partisan, the probability that the moderate wins is π(C,0;ξ). Thus, the party running
t h em o d e r a t eo b t a i n st h ep a y o ﬀ
UL(M,P)=UR(P,M)=π(C,0;ξ)β(1 − x − d) − β(1 − 2d),
and the party running the partisan obtains
UL(P,M)=UR(M,P)=−π(C,0;ξ)β(1 − x − d).
Irrespective of the type of candidate the opposing party runs, the gain from running a moderate
as opposed to a partisan is




This “gain” is increasing in the probability that a moderate defeats a partisan. It is also negative
when π(C,0;ξ)=1
2 and positive when π(C,0;ξ)=1 .T h u s ,l e t t i n g
π∗ =
1 − 2d
2(1 − x − d)
,
18running a moderate is a dominant strategy for each party if π(C,0;ξ) exceeds π∗, while running
a partisan is a dominant strategy for each party if π(C,0;ξ)i sl e s st h a nπ∗.I fπ(C,0;ξ)e q u a l s
π∗, then each party is indiﬀerent between running a partisan and a moderate. It follows that, if
(σ,C,ξ,ρ) is a symmetric equilibrium, then σ =0i fπ(C,0;ξ)i sl e s st h a nπ∗ and σ =1i fπ(C,0;ξ)
exceeds π∗.
4.3 Voter behavior
The next task is to understand, for given σ, how voters respond to advertising. Recall ﬁrst that
the eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising ξ is given by:
ξ = ξR(1,0) = 1 − H(vR(R;1,0) − vR(L;1,0)).
It is the case that vR(R;1,0) = −(1 − ρ)β(x − d)a n dvR(L;1,0) = −β(1 − 2x) and hence the
above equation implies that ξ is related to voters’ beliefs about the probability an unadvertised
candidate is moderate ρ in the following way:
ξ =1− H(ρβ(x − d) − β(3x − 1 − d)).
Letting ρ =[ β(3x−1−d)+ε]/β(x−d)a n dρ =[ β(3x−1−d)−ε]/β(x−d), our earlier assumptions
on the size of ε imply that campaign advertising is completely ineﬀective (ξ =0 )w h e nρ ≥ ρ and
maximally eﬀective (ξ =1 )w h e nρ ≤ ρ.
Voters’ beliefs about unadvertised candidates must be consistent with the strategies of parties




σ[1 − λ(C)] + (1 − σ)
.
Moreover, by assumption, if σ =0 ,t h e nρ = 0. We can now establish that, in equilibrium, parties
must be indiﬀerent between running a moderate and a partisan.
Lemma 2 Let (σ,C,ξ,ρ) be a symmetric political equilibrium. Then, π(C,0;ξ)=π∗.
19To understand this result, note that if moderates defeated partisans with a probability greater
than π∗ then both parties would choose moderates. But then campaign advertising would be
completely ineﬀective because moderate voters would know that their party’s candidate was mod-
erate and hence would never switch their votes to the opposing party’s candidate. If advertising
was ineﬀective, interest groups would make no contributions and hence moderates would have no
advantage against partisans - a contradiction. If instead moderates defeated partisans with a prob-
ability less than π∗, both parties would choose partisans. But then campaign advertising would
be fully eﬀective which implies that moderate candidates would receive suﬃcient contributions to
defeat partisans with probability one - a contradiction.
Now deﬁne σ to be the highest probability with which parties may select moderates that is
consistent with parties receiving suﬃcient contributions to be indiﬀerent. Formally, σ =m a x {σ ∈
[0,1] : π(b C(σ,1),0;1) ≥ π∗}. If σ < 1a n dσ > σ, then interest groups will not contribute
suﬃciently to moderate candidates to ensure that they defeat partisans with a probability π∗
even when campaign spending is maximally eﬀective. Thus, by Lemma 2, such a σ cannot be part
of a symmetric equilibrium. In the Appendix, it is demonstrated that
σ =m i n {1,
[(2π∗ − 1)2 +1 ] [ β(1 − γ)θ(1 − x − d) − 4α]
β(1 − γ)θ[(1 − x − d)(2π∗ − 1)2 + x − d]
}.
Observe that σ will be close to 0 when the parameters are such that Assumption 1 only just holds.
Next, for all σ ∈ [0,σ]l e tb ξ(σ) solve the equation π(b C(σ,ξ),0;ξ)=π∗.I n t u i t i v e l y ,b ξ(σ)i s
the level of advertising eﬀectiveness that would induce interest groups to contribute an amount
suﬃcient to make a moderate candidate win with probability π∗ against a partisan when they
expect the opposing party to choose a moderate with probability σ. Lemma 2 implies that if
(σ,C,ξ,ρ) is a symmetric equilibrium, it must be the case ξ = b ξ(σ), which determines voters’
behavior as a function of σ.
Several properties of b ξ(σ) should be noted. First, since π(b C(0,1),0;1) = 1, b ξ(0) must be less
20than 1. Second, the function b ξ(·)i si n c r e a s i n go n[ 0 ,σ] because the higher the probability the
opposing party selects a moderate the lower the incentive to contribute. Finally, if σ is less than
1, it is the case that b ξ(σ)=1 .
4.4 Political equilibrium
At this point, we have established that if (σ,C,ξ,ρ) is a symmetric political equilibrium then the
eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising is b ξ(σ), the level of campaign contributions is b C(σ, b ξ(σ)),
and σ must belong to the interval [0,σ]. Moreover, the equilibrium belief that an unadvertised
c a n d i d a t ei sm o d e r a t em u s tb es u c ha st og e n e r a t et h ev o t i n gb e h a v i o rb ξ(σ)a n d ,s i n c eσ > 0,19
σ must be related to C and ρ via Bayes Rule. More formally, for any given value of ξ,l e tb ρ(ξ)b e
the set of voter beliefs that are consistent with such behavior.20 T h e n ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
ρ ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ)) and that
σ =
ρ
ρ +( 1− ρ)(1 − λ(b C(σ, b ξ(σ))))
.
Conversely, if there exists σ ∈ (0,σ] with the property that there exists ρ0 ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ)) such that the
above equation holds, then (σ, b C(σ, b ξ(σ)), b ξ(σ),ρ0) is a symmetric equilibrium. These observations
allow us to establish the following result:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique symmetric political equilibrium. In this equilibrium, parties
select moderates with positive probability. Moderate candidates receive campaign contributions
from interest groups that allow them to defeat partisans with a probability between 1
2 and 1.
In equilibrium, contributions ﬁnance the provision of information about candidates to voters
and increase the probability that the candidate who would be majority preferred if voters had
perfect information wins. They therefore help to produce outcomes closer to those that would
arise under perfect information. Moreover, the fact that candidates may receive contributions
19 We can rule out the possibility that σ = 0, since that implies (by assumption) that ρ = 0 and this belief cannot
generate the voting behavior b ξ(0) since b ξ(0) is less than 1.
20 Formally, b ρ(ξ)={ρ ∈ [0,1] : ξ =1− H(ρβ(x − d) − β(3x − 1 − d))}.
21provides parties with an incentive to select candidates with characteristics that the majority of
voters want. Thus the model provides a framework in which campaign contributions play the role
that they are commonly understood to play.
Depending on the parameter values, the equilibrium is either interior or boundary.I n a n
interior equilibrium, parties select moderates with a probability σ less than σ and campaign
advertising is less than fully eﬀective (ξ < 1). In such an equilibrium, the level of campaign
spending exceeds α(2π∗−1). In a boundary equilibrium, parties select moderates with probability
σ, campaign advertising is maximally eﬀective (ξ =1 ) , and campaign spending equals α(2π∗−1).
The equilibrium will be a boundary equilibrium if σ < ρ2π∗/[ρ2π∗ +1− ρ].21 Since ρ > 0,
equilibrium will be of the boundary variety when the parameters are such that Assumption 1 is
only just satisﬁed.
4.5 Is there too much campaign spending in equilibrium?
In popular debate concerning campaign ﬁnance reform in the United States, the question of
whether there is too much or too little money spent on campaigns is often raised. Our model
suggests one way of thinking about this rather nebulous question. Let (σ∗,C∗,ξ∗,ρ∗)b et h e
symmetric equilibrium. Given the behavior of parties and voters as described by σ∗ and ξ∗,t h e
contribution level that maximizes aggregate welfare is Co =a r gm a xW(σ∗,π(C,0,ξ∗),2σ∗C). If
C∗ is less than Co, there is a natural sense in which contributions are underprovided. For if
interest groups were to give a little more, then, holding constant the behavior of parties and
voters, aggregate welfare would increase. It should be stressed that underprovision according to
this deﬁnition has no obvious implications for policy. For any policy eﬀort to increase interest
groups’ contributions will alter the behavior of parties and voters. Nonetheless, the deﬁnition
21 This follows from the proof of Proposition 1. Using t h en o t a t i o ni n t r o d u c e di nt h ep r o o f ,w ek n o wt h a t
b ξ(σ)=1 ,f(0) = ρ and b C(σ,0) = α(2π∗ −1) if σ < 1. It is now straightforward to verify that ϕ(σ) ≥ 0i fa n do n l y
if the above inequality is satisﬁed.
22facilitates a clear understanding of the (ﬁrst order) divergences between the private and social
incentives to contribute.











γ{β(1 − x − d) − 2π(Co,0;ξ∗)β(1 − 2x)} =2 σ∗.
The left hand side represents the social marginal beneﬁt of contributions which is that they raise
the probability that a moderate defeats a partisan. This raises the expected aggregate welfare of
moderates, assuming that 1−x−d
2(1−2x) > π(·).22 The right hand side represents the social marginal
cost which is the increase in expected expenditures. The equilibrium level of contributions, on the
other hand, satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
σ∗∂π(C∗,C∗;ξ∗)
∂CL
β(1 − 2x)+( 1− σ∗)
∂π(C∗,0;ξ∗)
∂CL




The left hand side represents the private marginal beneﬁt of contributions to an interest group
member and the right hand side represents the private marginal cost.
These expressions reveal two sources of diﬀerences between the private and social incentives to
contribute. First, from a social perspective campaign contributions are only useful when moderates
are running against partisans. Thus, if the probability of such races is low because both parties
are very likely to pick moderates then the social marginal beneﬁt of contributions will be small or
22 It is interesting to note that if x<(1 + d)/3t h e n 1−x−d
2(1−2x) < 1s oi ti sp o s s i b l et h a tπ c o u l db es oh i g ht h a t
raising the probability that a moderate defeats a partisan may actually be harmful to moderates. To understand
this, note that there are three eﬀects of raising π on the expected payoﬀ of a representative moderate. The ﬁrst is
to increase the likelihood that when a moderate runs against a partisan, the moderate wins. This eﬀect is positive,
because moderates receive a higher expected payoﬀ when a moderate is elected. The second eﬀect is to decrease the
size of the expected payoﬀ arising when a moderate wins. This occurs because raising π increases the likelihood that
the representative moderate will end up with a moderate candidate of the opposing ideology. The third eﬀect is to
increase the expected payoﬀ arising when a partisan wins. Raising π increases the likelihood that the representative
moderate will be on the same side as the partisan. The overall eﬀect is negative when the second eﬀect dominates
the ﬁrst and third.
23zero. By contrast, interest groups still have an incentive to contribute even if they know that the
opposing party is very likely to select a moderate. This reﬂects the purely distributional incentive
that they would prefer the moderate on their side of the ideological fence to win. Second, even
when moderate versus partisan races are likely, the private incentives to contribute do not match
up with the social incentives. The former reﬂect the fraction of interest group members and the
gains to these citizens from having a moderate from their own side as opposed to a partisan from
the other. The latter reﬂect the fraction of moderates in the population and the gain to them of
raising the probability that a moderate defeats a partisan.
These divergences mean that contributions can be over or under-provided according to our
deﬁnition.23 Overprovision arises when the probability that parties select moderates is high.
In this case, campaign contributions have no direct social beneﬁt and are purely wasteful rent
seeking in the sense of Tullock (1980).24 Underprovision arises when parties select partisans with
as i g n i ﬁcant probability and the fraction of interest group members (1−γ)θ/2 is small relative to
the fraction of moderates γ. In this case, campaign contributions have a signiﬁcant social beneﬁt
but this is not internalized by interest group members who care only about their own (purely
redistributive) beneﬁt.
As noted in Section 2, the possibility of both over and underprovision of advertising also arises
in markets with diﬀerentiated products. The fact that the beneﬁts ﬁrms obtain from advertising
come partially at the expense of their competitors corresponds to the purely redistributive nature
of the beneﬁts interest groups get from ﬁnancing political advertising. Moreover, the fact that
ﬁrms do not take into account the surplus their advertising creates for consumers is similar to
23 Speciﬁc numerical examples are available from the author on request.
24 See Congelton (1986) for an interesting discussion of political advertising as rent-seeking. He observes that
political advertising has rent-seeking aspects since it involves competition for a distributional gain. However, in
contrast to standard rent-seeking, it has the spillover beneﬁt of providing valuable information to voters. Thus, it
is not clear that it produces rent-seeking losses of the usual form. Our analysis provides a concrete way of thinking
about the informational beneﬁts and sheds light on the circumstances under which they will be large or small
relative to the rent-seeking losses.
24interest groups not taking into account the beneﬁts of their activities to moderate voters.
5 The impact of contribution limits
We now consider a policy that puts an upper limit on the contributions that interest groups can
make. We investigate the impact that such a limit will have on equilibrium and when limits will
enhance aggregate welfare. The limit will be denoted by L. Obviously, to have any impact, L must
be less than the laissez-faire level of campaign contributions and this is assumed in the sequel.
5.1 Equilibrium with contribution limits
If the contribution limit is suﬃciently small so that π(L,0;1) < π∗, then, no matter how eﬀective
campaign advertising is, both parties will select partisans. The probability of a moderate defeating
ap a r t i s a ni ss i m p l yi n s u ﬃcient to induce parties to select one. In such circumstances, equilib-
rium involves both parties selecting partisans. Noting that the condition that π(L,0;1) < π∗ is
equivalent to L<α[2π∗ − 1], yields:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the contribution limit L is less than α[2π∗ − 1].T h e n ,t h e r ee x i s t s
a unique symmetric political equilibrium. In this equilibrium, parties select partisans and expected
campaign spending is zero.
A contribution limit less than this critical value eﬀectively eliminates all campaign spending.
Even though moderate candidates would attract contributions, parties do not select moderates
because the electoral advantages from so doing are not suﬃcient to compensate for the compromise
in ideology. Hence no campaign spending arises in equilibrium. It follows from this proposition
that if the laissez-faire equilibrium is a boundary equilibrium so that C = α[2π∗ − 1], then even
a very small contribution limit will completely eliminate campaign spending.
If the contribution limit is such that π(L,0;1) ≥ π∗, equilibrium has a similar structure to the
laissez-faire. In particular, as the following result shows, the probability that a moderate defeats
25a partisan must be the same as in the laissez-faire.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the contribution limit L is at least as big as α[2π∗ −1] and let (σ,C,ξ,ρ)
be a symmetric political equilibrium. Then, C = L and ξ solves the equation π(L,0;ξ)=π∗.
Thus, if the contribution limit is large enough, equilibrium still has the property that parties
are indiﬀerent between selecting moderate and partisan candidates. The equation π(L,0;ξ)=
π∗ has a unique solution e ξ(L)=( L + α)(2π∗ − 1)/2Lπ∗. Note that e ξ(L) is decreasing, implying
that stricter contribution limits increase the eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising. Campaign
advertising must be more eﬀective if the probability of a partisan defeating a moderate candidate
remains the same.
The equilibrium belief that an unadvertised candidate is moderate must be such as to generate




ρ +( 1− ρ)(1 − λ(L))
.
If σ =0 ,t h e nρ = 0 and hence e ξ(L) = 1. This requires that L = α(2π∗−1). With this background,
we are now able to establish:
Proposition 3 If the contribution limit L is bigger than α[2π∗−1] there exists a unique symmetric
political equilibrium, while if the limit L is exactly α[2π∗−1] there are multiple symmetric equilib-
ria. In either case, imposing the limit does not change the probability that a moderate candidate
defeats a partisan. However, the limit reduces both the probability that parties select moderates
and expected campaign spending. The smaller the limit, the larger are these reductions.
To sum up, contribution limits that are at least as big as α[2π∗ − 1] do not impact the prob-
ability a moderate defeats a partisan. Rather, they reduce the probability that parties select
moderates. Intuitively, because limits reduce campaign advertising but do not impact the proba-
bility a moderate defeats a partisan, the eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising must increase. The
26only way this can happen is that voters believe that unadvertised candidates are less likely to be
moderates. This in turn requires that parties select moderates with a lower probability.
5.2 Contribution limits and welfare
The distributive consequences of contribution limits are clear from Propositions 2 and 3. Mod-
erates are made worse oﬀ because the probability of parties selecting moderates is reduced.25
Leftists and rightists who do not belong to interest groups are unaﬀected, while interest group
members are actually made better oﬀ because they spend less of their resources on campaign
contributions. Thus imposing contribution limits redistributes from moderates to interest group
members.
Less clear is the aggregate welfare impact of contribution limits. Are the gains to interest group
members more than oﬀset by the losses to moderates? To investigate this, let (σ∗,C∗,ξ∗,ρ∗)
denote the laissez-faire equilibrium and let (σ∗(L),C∗(L),ξ∗(L),ρ∗(L)) denote the equilibrium
with contribution limit L.26 Similarly, let E∗ denote expected campaign spending in the laissez-
faire and E∗(L) spending with limit L. We are interested in comparing W(σ∗,π(C∗,0,ξ∗),E∗)
and W(σ∗(L),π(C∗(L),0,ξ∗(L)),E∗(L)). Matters are simpliﬁed by noting that if L is bigger than
α[2π∗ − 1] imposing the limit has no impact on the probability that moderates defeat partisans.
Moreover, if L is smaller than α[2π∗ − 1] then, parties never select moderates and hence the
probability that a moderate defeats a partisan is irrelevant. Thus, for analytical purposes, we
may assume that the limit leaves unchanged the probability a moderate defeats a partisan and
only impacts the probability that parties select moderates and expected campaign spending. This
permits a diagrammatic analysis.
Such an analysis is presented in Figure 1 under the assumption that the laissez-faire is an
interior equilibrium. The horizontal axis measures expected campaign spending and the vertical
25 It is readily veriﬁed that WM(σ,π(C,0;ξ)) is increasing in σ.
26 If L = α(2π∗ − 1), let (σ∗(L),C∗(L),ξ∗(L),ρ∗(L)) be any one of the multiple possible equilibria.
27axis measures the probability that parties select a moderate. The family of indiﬀerence curves
represent social preferences over diﬀerent (E,σ) combinations. These indiﬀerence curves are up-
ward sloping, convex, and parallel to each other.27 Since the social ideal would be to have parties
select moderates for sure and no campaign spending, moving to the left yields higher levels of
welfare.
The laissez-faire outcome is represented by the point (E∗,σ∗). Introducing a limit lowers both
the probability that parties select moderates and expected campaign spending. The curve joining
the points (E∗,σ∗)a n d(b E,b σ) is obtained by successively reducing the limit from C∗ to α(2π∗−1)
and tracing out the points (E∗(L),σ∗(L)). When the limit reaches α[2π∗ − 1], there are multiple
(E,σ) combinations that are possible equilibria. The highest of these is the point ( b E,b σ)a n d
the lowest is (0,0).28 The remaining possible equilibrium combinations lie on a straight line
connecting ( b E,b σ)a n d( 0 ,0).29 The slope of this line can be shown to be larger than the slope
of the curve joining the points (E∗,σ∗)a n d(b E,b σ)a tt h ep o i n t(b E,b σ). Reducing the limit below
α(2π∗ − 1) yields the point (0,0). The curve joining (0,0) to (E∗,σ∗) therefore represents the
locus of possibilities that society might achieve with contribution limits.
To determine whether introducing a particular limit L increases or decreases social welfare, we
need to locate the point on the possibility locus that the limit generates and see if this point lies
on a higher social indiﬀerence curve than the laissez-faire outcome. In Figure 1, social indiﬀerence
curves are suﬃciently ﬂat so that any contribution limit puts society on a lower social indiﬀerence
curve and hence reduces aggregate welfare. Obviously, this is not the only possibility.
Figure 1 assumes that the laissez-faire equilibrium is interior. If it is a boundary equilibrium,
27 The indiﬀerence curves are implicitly deﬁned by the equality W(σ,π∗,E)=K for some constant K.T h e
indiﬀerence curves have slope dσ
dE = 1









29 This is established in the pro o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4b e l o w .
28the laissez-faire outcome (E∗,σ∗) must lie on the curve connecting ( b E,b σ)a n d( 0 ,0). In this case,
society’s possibility locus just consists of the points (E∗,σ∗)a n d( 0 ,0) and the question of the
desirability of contribution limits is very simple.
We can now use this diagrammatic apparatus to understand the following proposition:
Proposition 4: (i) If β >
4α[θ(x−d)+1−2x]
θ(1−2x)(1−x−d) there exists γ < 1 − 4α
βθ(1−x−d) such that for all
γ ∈ (γ,1− 4α
βθ(1−x−d)), imposing any contribution limit would reduce aggregate welfare. (ii) There
exists γ > 0, such that for all γ ∈ (0,γ), there exists a welfare enhancing contribution limit.
Part (i) provides a condition on β under which imposing contribution limits is always welfare
reducing if the fraction of moderates is suﬃciently large. Part (ii) says that if moderates make
up a suﬃciently small fraction of the population, then there will exist contribution limits that
would improve welfare. The latter result is easy to understand once one realizes that the social
indiﬀerence curves become steeper and steeper as the fraction of moderates goes to zero. To
understand part (i), note that as we increase the fraction of moderates, the size of the interest
groups decreases and hence the generosity of contributions decreases. Eventually, the laissez-faire
equilibrium becomes a boundary equilibrium. Accordingly, the laissez-faire outcome must lie on
the line connecting ( b E,b σ)a n d( 0 ,0) and any contribution limit must move society to the point
(0,0). Under the stated condition on β,t h ep o i n t(b E,b σ) must lie on a higher social indiﬀerence
curve than (0,0) for suﬃciently large values of γ in the admissible range.30 By the convexity of
the indiﬀerence curves, any point (E,σ) lying on the line is also socially preferred to (0,0) and
hence the result.
Proposition 4 suggests the possibility of a stronger result which says that, under the condition
on β, contribution limits are desirable if and only if the fraction of moderates is below some critical
level. This is indeed the case if, for all γ, the curve joining the points (E∗,σ∗)a n d(b E,b σ)i nF i g u r e
30 The admissible range consists of those values consistent with Assumption 1 holding.
291i sc o n c a v e . 31 W h i l et h i si st h ec a s ew h e nε is uniformly distributed (i.e., H(ε)=ε+ε
2ε ), it would
not appear to be true in general. Since, in principle, it is possible for the result not to hold in the
presence of non-concavities, Proposition 4 appears the best general result available.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of political competition with campaign contributions and infor-
mative advertising. In equilibrium, contributions ﬁnance the provision of information about can-
didates to voters and increase the probability that the candidate who would be majority preferred
were voters perfectly information wins. Contributions therefore help to produce more informed
choices. Moreover, the existence of campaign contributions provides parties with an incentive to
select candidates with characteristics that the majority of voters want. Thus the model provides a
framework in which campaign contributions play the role they are commonly understood to play
in reality.
The model facilitates analysis of the often raised question of whether there is too much or
too little spending on campaigns. Taking as given parties’ candidate selection strategies and the
eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising, one can ask whether aggregate welfare would be higher if
interest groups provided more or less money to candidates. In general, equilibrium spending levels
31 To see this, let W(σ,π∗,E;γ) denote the aggregate welfare function and C∗(γ) the laissez-faire level of cam-
paign spending when the fraction of moderates is γ. Similarly, let (E∗(γ),σ∗(γ)) denote the probability that parties
select moderates and expected campaign spending in the laissez-faire and (E∗(L;γ),σ∗(L;γ)) these variables with
limit L.W e n e e d t o s h o w t h a t i f f o r s o m e b γ there exists b L<C ∗(b γ)s u c ht h a tW(σ∗(b γ),π∗,E∗(b γ);b γ) is smaller
than W(σ∗(b L;b γ),π∗,E∗(b L;b γ);b γ)t h e n ,i fγ0 <b γ,t h e r ee x i s t ss o m eL0 <C ∗(γ0)s u c ht h a tW(σ∗(γ0),π∗,E∗(γ0);γ0)
is smaller than W(σ∗(L0;γ0),π∗,E∗(L0;γ0);γ0). Interest groups are bigger when γ is lower which leads to more
contributions and hence a higher probability of electing moderates and higher campaign expenditures. Thus,
(E∗(γ0),σ∗(γ0)) lies to the northeast of the point (E∗(b γ),σ∗(b γ)). Note also that the equilibrium with contri-
bution limits is independent of γ provided that L<C ∗(γ). This means that (b E,b σ) is independent of γ,a n d
that the curve connecting (E∗(γ0),σ∗(γ0)) to (b E,b σ) coincides with that connecting (E∗(b γ),σ∗(b γ)) to (b E,b σ)f o r
limits L less than or equal to C∗(b γ). Since W(σ∗(b γ),π∗,E∗(b γ);b γ) is smaller than W(σ∗(b L;b γ),π∗,E∗(b L;b γ);b γ),
it follows that W(σ∗(C∗(b γ);γ0),π∗,E∗(C∗(b γ);γ0);b γ)i ss m a l l e rt h a nW(σ∗(b L;γ0),π∗,E∗(b L;γ0);b γ). If the curve
connecting (E∗(γ0),σ∗(γ0)) to (b E,b σ) is concave it is easy to see diagrammatically that this must imply that
W(σ∗(γ0),π∗,E∗(γ0);b γ)i ss m a l l e rt h a nW(σ∗(b L;γ0),π∗,E∗(b L;γ0);b γ). Since the social indiﬀerence curves
are ﬂatter when the fraction of moderates is γ0,t h i si m p l i e st h a tW(σ∗(γ0),π∗,E∗(γ0);γ0) is smaller than
W(σ∗(L∗;γ0),π∗,E∗(L∗;γ0);γ0).
30may be too low or too high because of the divergences between the private incentives of interest
groups to contribute and the social beneﬁts of such contributions. Overprovision arises when
parties are highly likely to select moderates, in which case campaign contributions have no social
beneﬁt. Underprovision arises when parties are more likely to select partisans and interest group
membership is small relative to the number of moderates. In this case, campaign contributions
have a social beneﬁt that dwarfs the purely distributional beneﬁts accruing to interest group
members.
While the question of too much or too little spending is an interesting one, the model makes
clear that any change in the regulation of campaign contributions is likely to impact not only
contribution levels but also parties’ candidate selection strategies and the eﬀectiveness of campaign
advertising. Contribution limits were shown to reduce the likelihood that parties select moderates
and raise the eﬀectiveness of campaign spending. The impact of limits on citizens’ welfare is
redistributive. Moderate voters are made worse oﬀ. Partisans who do not belong to interest
groups are unaﬀected because the increase in the likelihood of electing a partisan of their own
ideology is oﬀset by the increase in the probability of electing a partisan of the opposing ideology.
Partisans who are interest group members are actually made better oﬀ because they spend less of
their resources on campaign contributions. The question of whether the gains to interest group
members oﬀset the losses to moderate voters turns on the fraction of the latter in the population.
Contribution limits are always desirable from an aggregate viewpoint when only a small fraction
of the population are moderates, while limits will tend to be harmful when moderates dominate.
This paper represents only a small step in developing an understanding of campaign ﬁnance and
its regulation. Nonetheless, the framework could readily be extended to shed further light. One
useful extension would be to introduce asymmetries in the power of the interest groups supporting
t h et w op a r t i e s . T h i sc o u l db ed o n eb ya s s u m i n ge ither that a larger fraction of partisans were
interest group members on one side or, perhaps more realistically, that partisans on one side had
31greater wealth and hence a higher willingness to contribute. It would be interesting to understand
how such asymmetries might inﬂuence candidate selection and bias election outcomes. In this
context, the familiar argument that limits “level the political playing ﬁeld” could be scrutinized.
Much of the demand for campaign ﬁnance reform is motivated by the belief that giving by big
donors is service induced. One could introduce service induced contributions into the framework
by assuming that candidates could approach interest groups and oﬀer to provide policy favors in
exchange for contributions. Then, seeing advertising would lead voters to increase their estimates
that a candidate would enact special interest legislation when elected and hence dampen the
eﬀectiveness of campaign spending. Contribution limits might then impact the amount of policy
favors provided by reducing the incentives for candidates to solicit contributions. This in turn
may have interesting implications for the eﬀectiveness of campaign advertising.
Finally, there are many interesting questions concerning the allocation of campaign resources
across diﬀerent uses (see also Schultz (2001)). One could, for example, analyze the welfare impli-
cations of negative advertising by allowing candidates to provide information to voters about their
opponents’ records. In the model of this paper, this would provide a reason for contributing to
partisan candidates. Alternatively one could introduce another dimension of diﬀerence between
candidates (such as competence) and study candidates’ decisions as to which characteristic to
campaign on.
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347A p p e n d i x
Derivation of the Expected Payoﬀ o ft h eR e p r e s e n t a t i v eM o d e r a t e :It was shown in
the text that when both parties select moderates, a representative moderate’s expected payoﬀ
is −β(1 − 2x)/4. Suppose now that both parties select partisans. When µ<1/2, Party R’s
candidate wins. The representative moderate’s expected payoﬀ is therefore −µβ(1−x−d)−(1−
µ)β(x − d). If µ>1/2, Party L’s candidate wins and the representative moderate’s expected
payoﬀ is −µβ(x − d) − (1 − µ)β(1 − x − d). Taking expectations over the realization of µ,t h e









[µβ(1 − x − d)+( 1− µ)β(x − d)]dµ.
This equals
−(






Next, suppose that one party has selected a moderate and the other a partisan. For concrete-
ness, suppose that Party L has selected a moderate. Party R’s candidate will win if µ is less
than
1/2−δR(C,0)
δL(C,0)−δR(C,0). The representative moderate’s expected payoﬀ is then −µβ(1 − x − d) −
(1 −µ)β(x −d). If µ exceeds
1/2−δR(C,0)
δL(C,0)−δR(C,0),P a r t yL’s candidate will win and the representative










[µβ(1 − x − d)+( 1− µ)β(x − d)]dµ.
Using the fact that π(C,0;ξ)=1−
1/2−δR(C,0)











Noting that the probabilities that (i) both parties select moderates, (ii) both parties select par-
tisans, and (iii) only one party selects a moderate are, respectively, σ2, (1 − σ)2, and 2σ(1 − σ)
yields the welfare expression given in the text.
35P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Let (σ,ξ) ∈ [0,1]2 be given. For all (CL,C) ∈ <2
+ let
f(CL,C)=σπ(CL,C;ξ)β(1 − 2x)+( 1− σ)π(CL,0;ξ)β(1 − x − d) − 2CL/θ(1 − γ).
Then, we must show that there exists a unique C such that C =a r gm a x CL≥0 f(CL,C).
The ﬁrst step is to compute the probability of winning function. Using the functional form for
λ,w eo b t a i n
δL(CL,C R)=
CL(α + CR)+α((1 − ξ)CR + α)





(α + CL)(α + CR)
.
Note that δL(CL,C R) < 1
2 if and only if CL <
α[CR(2ξ−1)−α]
α+CR and that δR(CL,C R) > 1
2 if and only
if CL[α(2ξ − 1) − CR] > α(α + CR) .T h u s ,w eh a v et h a tπ(CL,C R;ξ)=0i fCL <
α[CR(2ξ−1)−α]
α+CR ;
π(CL,C R;ξ)=1i fCL[α(2ξ − 1) − CR] > α(α + CR)a n d
π(CL,C R;ξ)=
CL(α + CR)/2+α(1/2 − ξ)CR + α2/2
CL(α(1 − ξ)+CR)+α(1 − ξ)CR + α2,
otherwise. Over the range in which δR < 1
2 < δL the eﬀect of a small increase in interest group






2{CL(α(1 − ξ)+CR)+α(1 − ξ)CR + α2}2,
which is positive as long as ξ > 0. In addition, note that ∂2π
∂C2
L
< 0s ot h a tπ(·,C R;ξ)i sac o n c a v e
function over this range.
It will be useful to deﬁne the following functions:
h(CL,C)=σ
CL(α + C)/2+α(1/2 − ξ)C + α2/2






CL(α + C)/2+α(1/2 − ξ)C + α2/2
CL(α(1 − ξ)+C)+α(1 − ξ)C + α2β(1−2x)+(1−σ)β(1−x−d)−2CL/θ(1−γ).
36Note that, for all C, h(·,C)a n dg(·,C) are concave and continuously diﬀerentiable functions.





Suppose ﬁrst that ξ ≤ 1
2. Then, for all (CL,C R) it is clear that it must be the case that
δR(CL,C R) < 1
2 < δL(CL,C R). This implies that f(CL,C)=h(CL,C). It follows from the
properties of the function h(·,C)t h a tC =a r gm a x CL≥0 f(CL,C) if and only if
∂h(C,C)
∂CL ≤ 0w i t h






2(2(1 − ξ)αC + C2 + α2)
+
(1 − σ)ξαβ(1 − x − d)




Viewed as a function of C,
∂h(C,C)
∂CL is continuous, decreasing, and negative for C suﬃciently large.
Thus, if
∂h(0,0)
∂CL ≤ 0, C = 0 has the desired property. Otherwise, the C at which
∂h(C,C)
∂CL =0i s
the unique C with the desired property.
Now suppose that ξ > 1
2. Then, letting b f(CL,C)=m i n {h(CL,C),g(CL,C)},w eh a v et h a t :
f(CL,C)=−2CL/θ(1 − γ) if CL < max{0,
α[C(2ξ − 1) − α]
α + C
},
f(CL,C)=σβ(1 − 2x)+( 1− σ)β(1 − x − d) − 2CL/θ(1 − γ) if CL[α(2ξ − 1) − C] > α(α + C),
f(CL,C)=b f(CL,C) otherwise.
We now have:
Claim: C =a r gm a x CL≥0 f(CL,C) if and only if C =a r gm a x CL≥0 b f(CL,C)a n db f(C,C) ≥ 0.
P r o o fo fC l a i m :Let C =a r gm a x CL≥0 f(CL,C). If C ≤ α
2ξ−1 then f(CL,C)=b f(CL,C)f o r
all CL ≥ 0 and hence it is immediate that C =a r g m a x CL≥0 b f(CL,C). Moreover, b f(C,C) ≥
b f(0,C) ≥ 0.
If C> α





that f(C,C)=b f(C,C). Let e CL =a r gm a x CL≥0 b f(CL,C). It is the case that b f(CL,C)=h(CL,C)
if CL ≤ α
2ξ−1 and b f(CL,C)=g(CL,C)i fCL > α
2ξ−1.S i n c e
∂g(CL,C)
∂CL is negative for suﬃciently
37large CL, e CL exists. If e CL 6= C, then either e CL <
α[C(2ξ−1)−α]
α+C or e CL >
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C.I nt h ef o r m e r
c a s e ,w em u s th a v et h a tb f(C,C) < b f(e CL,C)=h(e CL,C) ≤ f(e CL,C) which is a contradiction.
In the latter case, we must have that b f(
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C,C) > b f(CL,C) for all CL <
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C.T h i s
in turn implies that f(
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C,C) >f (CL,C) for all CL 6=
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C which implies that
C =
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C - a contradiction. Finally, note that b f(C,C)=f(C,C) ≥ f(0,C) ≥ 0.
Now let C =a r gm a x CL≥0 b f(CL,C)a n db f(C,C) ≥ 0. If C ≤ α
2ξ−1 then f(CL,C)=b f(CL,C)




α+C ,w eh a v et h a tf(CL,C) ≤ 0 ≤ b f(C,C). Moreover, for all CL >
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C
we have that f(CL,C) ≤ b f(
α(α+C)
α(2ξ−1)−C,C) ≤ b f(C,C). Thus, C =a r gm a x CL≥0 f(CL,C). QED
Notice that b f(·,C) as the minimum of two concave functions is itself concave. It follows that
C =a r gm a x CL≥0 b f(CL,C) if and only if b f has a subgradient φ at C such that φ(CL −C) ≤ 0f o r
all CL ≥ 0 (see, for example, Theorem 3.4.3 of Bazaraa and Shetty (1979)). Thus, by the Claim,
it suﬃces to establish that there exists a unique C at which there is a subgradient with the desired
property and that this C also satisﬁes the inequality b f(C,C) ≥ 0.
Note ﬁrst that b f(CL,C)=h(CL,C)i fCL ≤ α
2ξ−1 and b f(CL,C)=g(CL,C)i fCL > α
2ξ−1.
It follows that the subgradient of b f(·,C)a ta n yCL is the derivative
∂h(CL,C)




∂CL if CL > α
2ξ−1.I f CL = α










∂CL ≤ 0, then
∂h(0,0)
∂CL CL ≤ 0 for all CL ≥ 0 and hence C = 0 has the desired property.
Moreover, it is the unique C with the property for if C0 > 0 then, since
∂h(C,C)




∂CL for all C, the subgradient of b f(·,C0)a tC0 is negative which implies that C0
cannot have the desired property. Finally, note that b f(0,0) = h(0,0) > 0.
If
∂h(0,0)




∂CL < 0, then there exists a unique C ∈ (0, α
2ξ−1) such that
∂h(C,C)
∂CL = 0 and this is the unique C with the desired property. It satisﬁes the inequality since









∂CL ≤ 0, then there exists a subgradient of b f(·, α
2ξ−1)a tCL =
α
2ξ−1 which satisﬁes φ = 0 and hence C = α
2ξ−1 has the desired property. This is also the unique











∂CL > 0, then since
∂g(C,C)
∂CL is continuous, decreasing and negative for C suﬃciently
large, there exists a unique C such that
∂g(C,C)
∂CL = 0 and this is the unique C with the desired
























[(2(1 − ξ)αC + C2 + α2) − ξαC] > 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that C> α
2ξ−1 > α.Q E D
P r o o fo fP r o p e r t i e so fb C(σ,ξ) : First we show that on the range of the parameter space in
which π(b C(σ,ξ),0,0) ∈ (1
2,1), b C is decreasing in σ and increasing in ξ. From the proof of Lemma
1, we know that over this range b C(σ,ξ) is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
∂h(b C,b C)
∂CL =0 . S i n c e
∂h(C,C)
∂CL is decreasing in C,i ts u ﬃces to show that
∂h(C,C)
∂CL is decreasing in σ and increasing in ξ.
We leave this to the reader.
Next we show that b C(0,1) = α, which implies that π(b C(0,1),0;1) = 1. When σ =0a n dξ =1










which is positive by Assumption 1. In addition,
∂g(C,C)
∂CL < 0 for all C. It now follows from the
proof of Lemma 1 that b C(0,1) = α.Q E D
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :We know that C = b C(σ,ξ) and hence we need to show that π(b C(σ,ξ),0;ξ)=
π∗. If not, then either π(b C(σ,ξ),0;ξ) > π∗ or π(b C(σ,ξ),0;ξ) < π∗. In the former case, parties
have a dominant strategy to choose moderates and hence σ =1 . S i n c eC>0, it follows that
by Bayes Rule ρ = 1. But this implies that ξ = 0 and hence that C = b C(σ,ξ)=0 . T h u s ,
π(C,0;ξ)=1
2 < π∗ - a contradiction. In the latter case, parties have a dominant strategy to
choose partisans and hence σ = 0. In addition, (by assumption) we know that ρ =0 . B u tt h i s
implies that ξ = 1 and hence, from the properties of b C(σ,ξ), that π(b C(0,1),0;1) = 1 > π∗ -a
contradiction. QED
P r o o fo fF o r m u l af o rσ:B yd e ﬁnition we know that
σ =m a x {σ ∈ [0,1] : π(b C(σ,1),0;1) ≥ π∗}.
Moreover, it is clear that b C(σ,1) satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
σαβ(1 − 2x)
2( b C2 + α2)
+








2( b C2 + α2)
=
2α − (1 − σ)βγθ(1 − x − d)
α(1 − γ)θσαβ(1 − 2x)
b C2 =
α2(1 − γ)θσβ(1 − 2x)
4α − 2(1 − σ)βγθ(1 − x − d)
− α2
We know that if σ < 1 then it must be the case that
b C(σ,1) = α(2π∗ − 1)
40or, equivalently,
b C2 = α2(2π∗ − 1)2
It follows that if σ < 1, then it must be the case that
(2π∗ − 1)2 +1=
(1 − γ)θσβ(1 − 2x)
4α − 2(1 − σ)βγθ(1 − x − d)
Solving for σ,w eo b t a i n
σ =
[(2π∗ − 1)2 +1 ] [ β(1 − γ)θ(1 − x − d) − 4α]
β(1 − γ)θ[(1 − x − d)((2π∗ − 1)2 +1 )− (1 − 2x)]
,
=
[(2π∗ − 1)2 +1 ] [ β(1 − γ)θ(1 − x − d) − 4α]
β(1 − γ)θ[(1 − x − d)(2π∗ − 1)2 + x − d]
.
This completes the proof of the formula. QED
Proof of Proposition 1: We know that (σ,C,ξ,ρ) is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if σ ∈
[0,σ], ξ = b ξ(σ), C = b C(σ, b ξ(σ)), ρ ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ)) and
σ =
ρ
ρ +( 1− ρ)(1 − λ(b C(σ, b ξ(σ))))
.
Thus, using the functional form for λ, there exists an equilibrium if and only if there exists (σ,ρ) ∈
[0,σ] × [0,1] such that ρ ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ)) and
σ =
ρ(b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α)
ρb C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α
.
The ﬁrst task is to understand the correspondence b ρ(ξ). It is the case that b ρ(0) = [ρ,1];
b ρ(1) = [0,ρ]; and b ρ(ξ)={f(ξ)} for all ξ ∈ (0,1) where f :[ 0 ,1] → [ρ,ρ] is the function deﬁned by:
f(ξ)=
β(3x − 1 − d) − H−1(ξ)
β(x − d)
.
For future reference, note that f(0) = ρ, f(1) = ρ,a n dt h a tf(ξ) is decreasing.
Now deﬁne the function ϕ :[ 0 ,σ] → < as follows:
ϕ(σ)=σ −
f(b ξ(σ))(b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α)
f(b ξ(σ))b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α
41It is the case that ϕ(0) < 0. This is because b ξ(0) ∈ (0,1) and f(ξ) > ρ for all ξ < 1. It is also
t h ec a s et h a tϕ(σ) is a continuously diﬀerentiable function that is increasing on [0,σ]. To see the
latter point, note that
ϕ0(σ)=1−
α[f0b ξ0(b C + α)+f(1 − f)b C0]
(f(b ξ(σ))b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α)2
and that both f0b ξ0 and b C0 are negative. For the latter, note that b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) must satisfy the
equation π(b C(σ, b ξ(σ)),0; b ξ(σ)) = π∗ and that increasing σ must raise the eﬀectiveness of campaign
advertising. This means that the amount of campaign contributions necessary to achieve the
probability π∗ falls.
Suppose now that ϕ(σ) ≥ 0. Then, there must exist a unique σ∗ such that ϕ(σ∗)=0 .L e t t i n g
ρ∗ = f(b ξ(σ∗)), it is clear that ρ∗ ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ∗)) and that
σ∗ =
ρ∗(b C(σ∗, b ξ(σ∗)) + α)
ρ∗ b C(σ∗, b ξ(σ∗)) + α
.
Moreover, for every σ ∈ [0,σ∗), b ξ(σ) < b ξ(σ∗) and hence ρ ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ)) implies that
σ <
ρ(b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α)
ρb C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α
.
Similarly, for every σ ∈ (σ∗,σ], b ξ(σ) > b ξ(σ∗) and hence ρ ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ)) implies that
σ >
ρ(b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α)
ρb C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α
.
Thus, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
If ϕ(σ) < 0, then for every σ ∈ [0,σ), b ξ(σ) < b ξ(σ) and hence ρ ∈ b ρ(b ξ(σ)) implies that
σ <
ρ(b C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α)
ρb C(σ, b ξ(σ)) + α
.
Thus, if there exists an equilibrium it must involve σ = σ. The fact that ϕ(σ) < 0m e a n st h a t
σ < 1 which in turn implies that b ξ(σ)=1 . It follows that b ρ(b ξ(σ)) = [0,ρ]. Now choose ρ∗ ∈ (0,ρ)
such that
σ =
ρ∗(b C(σ,0) + α)
ρ∗ b C(σ,0) + α
.
42Then, it is clear that (σ,ρ∗) satisfy the requirements of equilibrium and, moreover, since ρ∗ is
uniquely deﬁned, this is the only equilibrium.
This proves that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium (σ∗,C∗,ξ∗,ρ∗). The remainder
of the proposition follows from noting that σ∗ > 0a n dt h a tπ(C∗,0;ξ∗)=π∗ ∈ (1
2,1). QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :We claim that (0,L,1,0) is the unique symmetric equilibrium. It is
clear that it is an equilibrium, so we need only show that it is unique. We know that if (σ,C,ξ,ρ)
is a symmetric equilibrium with contribution limit L, then it must be the case that C ≤ L and
ξ ≤ 1. This implies that π(C,0,ξ) < π∗ which implies that σ = 0. This, in turn, implies that
ρ = 0 and hence that ξ = 1. This, in turn implies that C = L.E x p e c t e dc a m p a i g ns p e n d i n gi n
this equilibrium must be zero, because interest groups only give to moderates and parties always
select partisans. QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :We ﬁrst claim that π(C,0;ξ)=π∗.I fn o t ,t h e ne i t h e rπ(C,0;ξ) > π∗ or
π(C,0;ξ) < π∗. In the former case, σ =1 .S i n c eC>0, it follows that by Bayes Rule ρ =1 .B u t
this implies that ξ = 0 and hence that π(C,0;ξ)=1
2 < π∗ - a contradiction. In the latter case,
σ = 0. In addition, (by assumption) we know that ρ = 0. But this implies that ξ = 1 and hence
that C = L and that π(C,0;1) = π(L,0;1). But since L is at least as big as α[2π∗ − 1], we have
that π(L,0;0) ≥ π∗ - a contradiction.
It remains to show that C = L.L e t t i n g ( σ∗,C∗,ξ∗,ρ∗) be the laissez-faire equilibrium, we
know that π(C,0;ξ)=π(C∗,0;ξ∗)w h e r eC ≤ L<C ∗. It follows that ξ > ξ∗.I fσ = 0, it follows
immediately that C = L since if the constraint were not binding the equilibrium contribution level
would be b C(0,ξ) which must exceed C∗ and hence L.I fσ > 0t h e n
σ =
ρ
ρ +( 1− ρ)(1 − λ(C))
.
But we know that ρ < ρ∗ and that C<C ∗ which implies that σ < σ∗. This means that C = L
since if the constraint were not binding the equilibrium contribution level would be b C(σ,ξ)w h i c h
43must exceed C∗ and hence L.Q E D
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :We know that if (σ,C,ξ,ρ) is a symmetric equilibrium then ξ = e ξ(L)
and C = L.I fL is bigger than α[2π∗ − 1], then we know that ξ ∈ (0,1) which implies that ρ =
f(e ξ(L)) (where f is as deﬁned in Proposition 1) and that
σ =
f(e ξ(L))(L + α)
f(e ξ(L))L + α
.
This is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
If L equals α[2π∗ − 1], then we know that ξ = 1 which implies that ρ ∈ [0,ρ]. Letting
b σ(ρ)=
ρα2π∗
ρα[2π∗ − 1] + α
,
the set of equilibria are {(b σ(ρ),L,0,ρ):ρ ∈ [0,ρ]}.
It remains to show that both the probability that parties select moderates and expected cam-
paign spending are decreasing in the size of the limit. Let σ∗(L) denote the probability that
parties select moderates with limit L>α[2π∗ − 1]. Then
σ∗(L)=
f(e ξ(L))(L + α)






(fL+ α)[f + f0e ξ0(L + α)] − (f + f0e ξ0L)f(L + α)
(fL+ α)2
=
f2L + αf + αf0e ξ0(L + α) − f2(L + α)
(fL+ α)2
=
αf(1 − f)+αf0e ξ0(L + α)
(fL+ α)2
This is positive since f0e ξ0 > 0, which proves that σ∗(L)i sd e c r e a s i n go n( α[2π∗ − 1],C∗]. With
limit L = α[2π∗ − 1], the probability that parties select moderates is no greater than
ρα2π∗
ρα[2π∗ − 1] + α
.
44But for all L>α[2π∗ − 1 ] ,w eh a v et h a t
σ∗(L)=
f(e ξ(L))(L + α)






ρα[2π∗ − 1] + α
.
Expected campaign spending with limit L>α[2π∗ − 1] is given by
E∗(L)=2 σ∗(L)L.




ρα[2π∗ − 1] + α
)(α[2π∗ − 1]),
which is smaller than E∗(L) for all L>α[2π∗ − 1]. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :(i) Let (σ∗(γ),C∗(γ),ξ∗(γ),ρ∗(γ)) denote the laissez-faire equilibrium
when the fraction of moderates is γ and let E∗(γ) denote expected campaign spending. Further,
let W(σ,π∗,E,γ) denote aggregate welfare with the pair (E,σ). Recall that
σ =m a x {1,
[(2π∗ − 1)2 +1 ] [ β(1 − γ)θ(1 − x − d) − 4α]
β(1 − γ)θ[(1 − x − d)(2π∗ − 1)2 + x − d]
},




[(2π∗ − 1)2 +1 ] [ β(1 − γ)θ(1 − x − d) − 4α]
β(1 − γ)θ[(1 − x − d)(2π∗ − 1)2 + x − d]
.
Observe that since ρ > 0 the left hand side is positive, less than 1 and is independent of θ.T h e
right hand side is decreasing in γ and less than or equal to zero when
1−γ
2 ≤ 2α
βθ(1−x−d).T h u s ,
b γ < 1 − 4α
βθ(1−x−d).N o wl e t
γ =m a x {
4α(x − d)
β(1 − 2x)(1 − x − d)
,b γ}.
We claim that γ is smaller than 1 − 4α
βθ(1−x−d). To prove this, we need to show that
4α(x − d)
β(1 − 2x)(1 − x − d)
< 1 −
4α













4α[θ(x − d)+1− 2x]
θ(1 − 2x)(1 − x − d)
< β.
This holds by hypothesis.
When γ > γ, the laissez-faire equilibrium is a boundary equilibrium since, by construction,
ρ2π∗
[ρ2π∗+1−ρ] > σ .T h u s ,( C∗(γ),ξ∗(γ)) = (α(2π∗ − 1),0) and
(σ∗(γ),ρ∗(γ)) = (σ,
σ
2π∗ − (2π∗ − 1)σ
).
It follows that imposing any contribution limit will lead to both zero expected campaign spending
and a zero probability of parties selecting moderates (i.e., the pair (E,σ)=( 0 ,0)). Thus, to
complete the proof all we need to do is to show that welfare at the laissez-faire equilibrium
W(σ∗(γ),π∗,E∗(γ),γ) is greater than W(0,π∗,0,γ). The way we do this is to ﬁrst show that
(E∗(γ),σ∗(γ)) lies on the line joining (0,0) and ( b E,b σ) in Figure 1. We then show that any point
on this curve generates a higher level of welfare than does (0,0) under the stated condition.
Since ρ∗(γ)= σ
2π∗−(2π∗−1)σ,w ek n o wt h a t
σ =
ρ∗(γ)2π∗
ρ∗(γ)(2π∗ − 1) + 1
and that ρ∗(γ) ≤ ρ. It follows that the laissez-faire equilibrium belongs to the set
Φ = {(
ρ2π∗
ρ(2π∗ − 1) + 1
,α(2π∗ − 1),0,ρ):ρ ∈ [0,ρ]},
which is none other than the set of equilibria that can arise with the contribution limit L =
α(2π∗ − 1). Corresponding to any point in the set Φ is an expected campaign spending level and
a probability that parties select moderates (E(ρ),σ(ρ)). It is straightforward to show that
(E(ρ),σ(ρ)) = (
ρα(4π∗)(2π∗ − 1)
(ρ(2π∗ − 1) + 1)
,
ρ(2π∗)
(ρ(2π∗ − 1) + 1)
).
46Varying ρ between [0,ρ] yields the curve joining (0,0) to ( b E,b σ) in Figure 1. An explicit description
of the curve may be obtained by noting that
E−1(E)=
E
(2π∗ − 1)(α4π∗ − E)





This function is linear, establishing that the curve has the shape depicted in Figure 1.
We now show that any point on the curve (6=( 0 ,0)) yields a higher level of welfare than
(0,0) under the stated condition. Suppose that it were the case that ( b E,b σ) lay on a higher social
indiﬀerence curve than (0,0). Then, by the convexity of the social indiﬀerence curves, so must
any other point (6=( 0 ,0)) on the curve. To prove that ( b E,b σ) lies on a higher social indiﬀerence
curve than (0,0), it is enough to show that the slope of the social indiﬀerence curve at (b E,b σ)i s














Thus, the required condition is that
γ∂WM(b σ,π∗)/∂σ ≥ 2α(2π∗ − 1)







ψPP − σ(1 − σ)ψPM,
47where
ψPP =














= ψPP − ψPM − σ(ψPP + ψMM − 2ψPM).
It is straightforward to show that ψPP + ψMM > 2ψPM; ψPP > ψPM;a n dψPM > ψMM.T h e s e
inequalities imply that
∂WM(σ,π∗)
∂σ is positive but decreasing in σ. It follows therefore, that
∂WM(b σ,π∗)
∂σ
> ψPM − ψMM.
Moreover, since x − d>1 − 2x












Next observe that, using the deﬁnition of π∗,w eh a v e :
2α(2π∗ − 1) =
2α(x − d)
1 − x − d





1 − x − d
This is implied by the deﬁnition of γ and the fact that γ > γ.
(ii) There are two cases to consider. Suppose ﬁrst that b γ as deﬁned above is less than or equal
to 0. Then, for all γ, the laissez-faire equilibrium is a boundary equilibrium in which C∗(γ)=
48α(2π∗ − 1). As shown above, this means that the pair (E∗(γ),σ∗(γ)) lies on the line connecting
(0,0) and ( b E,b σ) depicted in Figure 1. Moreover, as we decrease γ towards 0, (E∗(γ),σ∗(γ)) moves
continuously up the curve reﬂecting the fact that σ is increasing. Now let
lim
γ→0











Since for all γ, W(0,π∗,0,γ)=−
β(1−2d)
2 ,t h e r em u s te x i s tγ > 0s u c ht h a tW(0,π∗,0,γ) >
W(σ∗(γ),π∗,E∗(γ),γ) for all γ ∈ (0,γ). Since (0,0) can be achieved by imposing any contribution
limit L<α(2π∗ − 1), the result follows.
If b γ is greater than 0, then for all γ ∈ (0,b γ), the laissez-faire equilibrium is an interior equi-
librium in which C∗(γ) > α(2π∗ − 1). As we decrease γ in this range, the equilibrium level of
contributions increases reﬂecting the greater size of the interest groups. In addition, the probabil-
ity that parties select moderates increases. This translates into a continuous rightward move of
the pair (E∗(γ),σ∗(γ)). Now let
lim
γ→0










and it again follows that there must exist γ > 0 such that W(0,π∗,0,γ) >W(σ∗(γ),π∗,E∗(γ),γ)
for all γ ∈ (0,γ). QED
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